At the end of a busy year across all sectors of the Built Environment we pause to re-visit the 5 most popular posts of 2015.
1.Changes under CDM 2015 – A Checklist
The Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 2015 (CDM 2015) govern the management of health, safety and welfare on construction projects in the UK. CDM 2015 will replace the current Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 2007 (CDM 2007). CDM 2015 will apply to both new and existing projects.
Available to download as a PDF from our free downloads area.
2. Free download: 4 steps to take when acting on the grant of an easement over tenanted land
A tenant can acquire a right for the benefit of its lease against an adjoining landowner. A tenant can also acquire a right against its own landlord, another tenant of its landlord or a third party. When dealing with the landlord or property owner of tenanted land on the grant of an easement, it is important to check whether any tenant of that land has rights which would interfere with the grant of the easement or which may require the tenant to join in to effectively grant the easement.
3. The Infrastructure Act 2015: Fracking’s key to the kingdom?
The Infrastructure Act 2015 (IA 2015) received Royal Assent on 12 February 2015 and this has had an effect on a couple of key areas connected with fracking.
To receive next month’s edition by email please register your details using the form on this page
Welcome to this month’s update by Lexis®PSL Property!
In this month’s update, we look at: (1) break clauses and rent paid in advance; (2) damages for breach of landlord’s repairing covenant; (3) easements and sporting and recreational rights; and (4) the Electronic Communications Code and section 25 notices.
Listen to the audio:
Watch the video (with supporting slides, mp4):
To receive next month’s edition by email please register your details using the form on this page.
On 12 December 2015, after two weeks and one day of fraught negotiations, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) at the 21st Conference of Parties (COP21) adopted the ‘Paris Agreement’. This post examines the key outcomes of the Agreement reached, the domestic aftermath, and considers whether this ‘historic climate change deal’ can deliver on its expectations.
Context
From the moment that Laurent Fabius, the French Foreign Minister and President of the COP21 Summit, hammered the gavel down to signal the adoption of the Paris Agreement, it was immediately and widely lauded as a ‘historic deal’. However, there haves also been criticisms of the Agreement, and rueful acknowledgments that it could have gone further in securing a global low carbon future. So what has been agreed and what is legally binding and what is not?
The Paris Agreement: key outcomes
The key objectives are laid out in Article of 2 of the Agreement. They are to:
Hold increases in temperature to well below 2°C and pursue efforts to limit temperature increases to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels;
Increase the ability of countries to adapt to the effects of climate change and foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas emissions development; and
Make finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate resilient development.
‘Well below 2°C’
Commentators have hailed the mere inclusion of a 1.5°C limit in the final text as a diplomatic triumph. However, as the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change admitted in her oral evidence to the ECC Committee, this 1.5°C target is ‘aspirational’ at the moment.
The stark truth is even taking into account what was promised in the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), the voluntary climate plans made by countries of what actions they intend to take to reduce their emissions, the world is on the path to a 2.7°C temperature increase. With this in mind, even more radical measures will need to be taken to prevent the 2°C upper threshold being breached.
Nationally Determined Contributions
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), updated voluntary climate plans, play a crucial role in achieving this target temperature limit. Unfortunately, there are no legally binding specific emissions targets. Instead, Article 4(2) mandates that Parties ‘shall pursue domestic mitigation measures with the aim of achieving the objectives of such contributions.’ This was clearly a necessary compromise to placate major emitting countries and ensure their support for the Agreement.
Nevertheless, the review mechanism gives a cause for cheer. Article 4(9) commits Parties to communicate their NDC every five years, which are to be recorded in a public registry held by the Secretariat, and are expected to show an increasing level of ambition to reduce emissions. Furthermore, all Parties are to ‘strive to formulate and communicate long term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies’.
Climate finance
This was one of the most contentious areas of discussion leading up to and during COP21. Article 9 of the Agreement places the onus on developed countries to provide financial resources to assist developing countries in mitigating and adapting to climate change, and to also ‘mobilise’ climate finance from a wide variety of sources.
Although the Agreement itself did not specify a monetary amount, the concomitant Decision sets out that before 2025 ‘the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement shall set a new collective quantified goal from a floor of USD 100 billion per year’, which will take into account the needs and priorities of developing countries. There is evidently huge scope for the global private sector to play a role in achieving this.
Other notable outcomes
Under Article 14, there will also be a periodic ‘global stocktake’ of the Agreement’s implementation with the first one due to take place in 2023. These are to take place subsequently every five years.
Countries are also obliged to regularly provide a ‘national inventory report of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases’ and the necessary information to track progress in implementing and achieving its NDC.
Domestic developments: caveats in recent energy policy announcements
With the elation at having gotten consensus between 196 Parties on climate change, one could be forgiven for believing this momentum from Paris would translate into domestic support for clean and renewable energy.
The UK government’s latest policy changes over solar PV, announced the day after the Secretary of State’s evidence session on COP21 outcomes, have been strongly criticised by the ECC Committee as ‘regrettable that the Government if further cutting support for renewable energy’ and lacking ‘clarity, constituency and continuity’. This is particularly so after the importance of energy policy, technology development and capacity building to the Climate Change Committee’s Fifth Carbon Budget and the Paris Agreement, with investor confidence in these energy infrastructures and projects very sorely shaken.
Comments
So can COP21 deliver? The spirit of international co-operation is certainly willing but much depends on what is offered and accomplished by national governments to truly make an impact. The UK government’s position on renewable energy serves as a cautionary tale of a government not putting its money where its mouth is. It will be important in the coming months and years to hold on to the impetus against climate change driven by COP21 and the Paris Agreement, before we can really measure its success.
In what circumstances is a tenant entitled to reimbursement of overpaid rent for a period following a lease break? The Supreme Court decided that a term for the rent to be repaid to the tenant for the period after termination could not be implied into four leases.
Background
Marks and Spencer plc (Appellant) v BNP Paribas Services Trust Company (Jersey) Limited and another (Respondents)[2015] UKSC 72
Marks and Spencer (M&S) were tenants of four floors in a building under four leases on the same terms. They served notice to break the leases. The break clause was conditional on there being no arrears of basic rent or VAT on the basic rent and on payment of a lump sum of just under £1m—reflecting exactly a year’s rent.
The break date fell in the middle of a quarter on 24 January 2012. On the quarter day prior to the break date (25 December 2011), M&S paid the full quarter’s rent, full quarter’s ‘car park licence fee’ (also reserved as rent) and the full quarter’s on-account service charge. Approximately six months prior to the break it also paid a year’s insurance premium.
The High Court allowed M&S’ claim to be reimbursed the amount which related to the period after the break date ie from 24 January 2012 to 24 March 2012.
The Court of Appeal allowed the landlord’s appeal, deciding that the lease, read as a whole against the relevant background, would not reasonably be understood to include a term providing for such reimbursement and so the test for an implied term was not met.
M&S appealed to the Supreme Court.
What was the issue involved?
M&S accepted that there was no provision in the leases expressly obliging the landlord to pay the apportioned sum to the tenant. Accordingly, in order to succeed, M&S had to establish that such an obligation had to be implied into the leases.
What did the Supreme Court decide?
The Supreme Court dismissed M&S’ appeal.
It confirmed that there are two types of contractual implied term. The first, with which this case was concerned, was a term which is implied into a particular contract, in the light of the express terms, commercial common sense, and the facts known to both parties at the time the contract was made.
The second type of implied terms arises because, unless such a term is expressly excluded, the law (sometimes by statute, sometimes through the common law) effectively imposes certain terms into certain classes of relationship.
What was the test for implication of a contractual term?
The judicial approach to the implication of contractual terms so far represented a clear, consistent and principled approach. A term will only be implied if it satisfies the test of business necessity. As per BP Refinery, for a term to be implied, the following conditions (which may overlap) had to be satisfied:
it must be reasonable and equitable
it must be necessary to give business efficacy to the contract, so that no term will be implied if the contract is effective without it
it must be so obvious that ‘it goes without saying’
it must be capable of clear expression
it must not contradict any express term of the contract
The Supreme Court acknowledged that it could be dangerous to reformulate the principles, but it added further comments:
the implication of a term is not critically dependent on proof of the actual intention of the parties when negotiating the contract. If one approaches the question by reference to what the parties would have agreed, one is not strictly concerned with the hypothetical answer of the actual parties, but with that of notional reasonable people in the position of the parties at the time they were contracting
a term should not be implied into a detailed commercial contract merely because it appears fair or merely because one considers that the parties would have agreed it if it had been suggested to them. Those are necessary but not sufficient grounds for including a term
however, it was questionable whether the requirement for reasonableness and equitableness, will usually, if ever, add anything—if a term satisfies the other requirements, it is hard to think that it would not be reasonable and equitable
a term will only be implied if it satisfies the test of business necessity or it is so obvious that it goes without saying—only one of these requirements need be satisfied, but it would be a rare case where only one of them was met
it was vital to formulate the question posed by the ‘officious bystander’ with the utmost care
necessity for business efficacy involved a value judgment. The test was not one of ‘absolute necessity’. A more helpful way of putting it may be that a term can only be implied if, without the term, the contract would lack commercial or practical coherence.
The Supreme Court also made some observations about the test as laid down in Belize:
the test in Belize as to whether a term is implied, is to be judged at the date the contract is made
Belize did not dilute the test for the implication of contractual terms
the process of implying a term was not part of the exercise of interpretation—even though the factors to be taken into account on an issue of construction are also taken into account on an issue of implication
Lord Neuberger confirmed that Lord Hoffmann’s observations in Belize were open to more than one interpretation on these points and some of those interpretations were wrong in law. In those circumstances, the right course for the Supreme Court to take was to say that those observations should henceforth be treated as a:
‘characteristically inspired discussion rather than authoritative guidance on the law of implied terms’
However, Lord Carnwarth, while agreeing that Belize did not dilute the test for implication of contractual terms, considered that, though the judgment had stimulated more than usual academic controversy, that was not sufficient reason to question its continuing authority. On the contrary, properly understood, it was a valuable and illuminating synthesis of the factors which should guide the court.
Lord Clarke agreed that Belize did not dilute the relevant test and also agreed with Lord Neuberger that as the factors to be taken into account on construction and implication were the same, that both processes were part of construction of the contract in a broad sense.
What about the general law as to apportionment of rent payable in advance?
It was well-established that rent, whether payable in arrears or advance, was not apportionable in time in common law. Section 2 of the Apportionment Act 1870 (AA 1870) provides that all rents and other periodical payments should be considered as accruing from day-to-day and be apportionable in respect of time accordingly. There was no doubt that AA 1870, s 2 applied to rent payable in arrear. The conclusion of the Court of Appeal in Ellis that AA 1870 did not apply to rent payable in advance was correct. This mirrors the position on forfeiture, where a landlord who forfeits a lease under which the rent is payable in advance is entitled to the payment of the whole of the rent which falls due on the quarter day preceding the forfeiture.
What were the Supreme Court’s conclusions?
There was force in the landlord’s argument that the leases were very detailed documents which had been entered into between two substantial and experienced parties and had been negotiated and drafted by expert solicitors. The implied term sought lay uneasily with the express terms. In particular, the provision that the tenant would be paid £150,000 if it did not exercise its right to break showed how carefully and fully the parties had considered and identified their rights against each other in relation to the break. This provision, combined with the break conditions as to payment by the tenant of the lump sum and for the rent to be paid up-to-date, showed that the parties had directed their minds to the specific question of what payments were to be made between them in connection with the break and, in particular, what sums were to be paid if the right to break either was implemented or was not implemented. It was therefore inappropriate for the court to step in and fill in what was no more than an arguable lacuna.
On the other hand, there was a strong case for an implied term on the basis argued by M&S that, had it paid the lump sum before 25 December 2011, it would have been known at that date that the lease would come to an end before 25 March 2012. Therefore, as the lease provided for the rent to be paid ‘proportionately for any part of a year’ the landlord would only have been due an appropriate portion of the basic rent on 25 December 2011 (ie up to the termination date on 24 January 2012). Commercial common sense mandated that it should be in the same position whether it paid the lump sum before or after 25 December 2011.
However, this was overridden by the general law on apportionment of rent. Given the clear, general understanding that neither the common law nor statute apportion rent payable in advance on a time basis, it would be wrong, save in a very clear case, to attribute to a landlord and a tenant, particularly where they had entered into a full and professionally drafted lease, an intention that the tenant should receive back an apportioned part of rent payable and paid in advance.
While the difference in result between the tenant paying the lump sum before or after 25 December 2011 could fairly be said to be capricious or anomalous, it did not begin to justify a suggestion that the contract was unworkable. Indeed, the result could not be said to be commercially or otherwise absurd, particularly as it was entirely up to the tenant as to when the sum was paid.
The Supreme Court came to the same conclusion regarding the:
car park licence fee, where the case was even stronger, as there was no wording regarding paying rent proportionately for any part of a year and the sum involved was very small in relative term
insurance rent, where the position was less clear, but, unless it could be shown to have been unreasonable for the landlord to have insured the building for the whole of the ensuing year when they did so, the reasons for dismissing the appeal in relation to the rent and car park licence fee applied equally to the insurance rent. After all, the insurance rent was a single annual sum, specifically reserved as rent, with no provision for apportionment, and it became payable in full in July 2011
The same conclusion did not apply to the service charge, in respect of which there was specific provision contemplating repayment.
What should lawyers take from this decision?
The message is clear—to be certain, reimbursement must be expressly provided for in the lease. The court will not readily imply a term for the reimbursement of overpaid rent.
The Supreme Court has provided clarity in deciding that M&S’ arguments—in particular as to the timing of the payment of the lump sum—were all overridden by the law as to apportionment of rent. Whereas, previously, the decisions of the courts below had left the waters slightly muddied with:
a key factor in the High Court’s decision to imply a term as to reimbursement was that the tenant had to pay a lump sum as compensation to the landlord, and
a key factor in the Court of Appeal’s decision not to imply a term being that the landlord remained uncertain whether the lease would terminate on the break date until the break premium was paid
The court also confirmed that:
the approach to apportionment of rent applies equally to a case where a lease determines by forfeiture as it does to a case where it determines by exercise of a right to break
reference to rent payable ‘proportionately for any part of a year’ related to payment of rent where a lease is terminated via a break clause and not just where the original lease term terminates by effluxion of time. The court agreed that had M&S paid the lump sum before 25 December 2011, it would have been known at that date that the lease would come to an end before 25 March 2012 and so—as the lease provided for the rent to be paid ‘proportionately for any part of a year’—the landlord would only have been due an appropriate portion of the basic rent on 25 December 2011 (ie up to the termination date on 24 January 2012)
The Supreme Court could be regarded as having muddied the waters regarding the reasoning in/authority ofBelize. However, as Lord Clarke pointed out:
‘although Lord Hoffmann emphasised that the process of implication was part of the process of construction of the contract, he was not resiling from the often stated proposition that it must be necessary to imply the term and that it is not sufficient that it would be reasonable to do so.’
The technical arguments on the reasoning have not called this central tenet into question and so may be unlikely to affect the end result in most cases.
Jane Fox-Edwards Real Estate Litigation specialist at Allen & Overy, who acted alongside the firm’s Head of Real Estate Imogen Moss for the landlords (the BNP Paribas companies as trustees for Britel Fund Trustees Limited and WELPUT):
The case law surrounding break clauses has produced some harsh decisions for tenants over the past few years. The tenant here was looking for a way of ameliorating the effects of unfavourable lease terms but the Supreme Court has firmly closed that door. In so doing, it introduces some welcome certainty which benefits everyone. But the judgment applies to contract law more widely. In keeping with other judgments this year, the message from the Supreme Court is clear. Where there is a detailed commercial contract the court will respect the bargain struck and veer away from interfering with what the parties have said.
Joanna Bhatia, solicitor in the Lexis®PSL Property team.
The views expressed by our Legal Analysis interviewees are not necessarily those of the proprietor.
It will have come as little surprise to most that the Conservative Government succeeded in getting the Onshore Hydraulic Fracturing (Protected Areas) Regulations 2015 (the Regulations) through in yesterday’s vote.
Since Cameron declared his party are going all out for fracking, there has been a suite of initiatives created to support fracking bids, and the fact that only four Conservatives voted against these Regulations, shows that the momentum in favour of fracking is continuing to build.
As our previous blog post highlighted, these Regulations prohibit fracking only above 1,200 metres beneath surface level within Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB), World Heritage Sites, National Parks, the Broads and Source Protection Zones 1. In practice, this simply adds 200 metres to the general 1,000 metres depth restriction found in the Infrastructure Act 2015.
This falls short of the level of protection originally promised by the Tories. The outrage this has sparked amongst many has only been exacerbated by the way these Regulations were pushed through without MP debate or public consultation.
Importantly, these Regulations leave out any protection for SSSIs and sites protected under EU Habitats and Wild Bird Directives and are also silent on the point of protection for surface development in all of these areas.
Surface activities
The Government is also exploring to what extent safeguards should be applied to surface activities associated with fracking in specified protected areas.
The recent consultation on Proposed Restrictions on Surface Development through the Petroleum Exploration and Development Licence (PEDLs) is proposing to prevent hydraulic fracturing operations taking place in wells drilled at the surface in specified protected areas, by adding in restrictions to PEDL conditions. (Note – this will have no impact on conventional drilling operations).
The protected areas for the purposes of the consultation do include SSSIs and Habitats and Wild Birds Directive sites, in addition to the areas that the Regulations protect from fracking above 1,200 metres below ground. However, the consultation is only looking at PEDLs yet to be granted, which means the PEDLs already in place wouldn’t be caught.
So, while it looks hopeful that we won’t end up with surface activities associated with fracking taking place in protected areas, there won’t be any additional safeguards in place from siting a fracking rig just outside a protected area, with a network of horizontal pipes accessing the rock below the 1000m or 1200m (depending on the site) limits.
This is all quite different in terms of safeguarding, from the outright ban on all sensitive areas originally promised by the Government.
If you are a Client and we have made a contract with you by electronic means you may be entitled to use an EU online dispute resolution service to assist with any contractual dispute you may have with us.
This service can be found at ec.europa/consumers/odr
Our email address is glg@hardwicklegal.com.
Hardwick Legal Solicitors website uses cookies so that we can provide you with the best user experience possible. Cookie information is stored in your browser and performs functions such as recognising you when you return to our website and helping our team to understand which sections of the website you find most interesting and useful.
Strictly Necessary Cookies
Strictly Necessary Cookie should be enabled at all times so that we can save your preferences for cookie settings.
If you disable this cookie, we will not be able to save your preferences. This means that every time you visit this website you will need to enable or disable cookies again.